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Abstract 
 
While most of the quantitative literature on quality of government involving European 
countries has focused on national differences, sub-national variation has been 
neglected, mainly due to the lack of data. This paper explores sub-national 
divergences in quality of government (understood as control of corruption, impartial 
treatment of citizens and government effectiveness) in three major policy areas (law 
enforcement, health and education) for more than 70 European regions. We address 
the question of why regions which share so many formal institutions (e.g. Northern 
and Southern Italy) do diverge so much in quality of government.  We propose two 
hypotheses to explain such variation.  First, similar to recent political economy 
literature, the paper underlines the importance of informal institutions historically 
transmitted. Yet, unlike this scholarship, the paper argues that it is not different 
cultural values (e.g. “generalized trust”) what explains regional path dependencies, 
but the persistence of patrimonial clientelistic networks created in those regions with 
historically unconstrained rulers.  Second, we test the impact of contemporary 
political institutions that represent the level to which governments regions share 
power. The empirical analysis shows strong evidence for our first hypothesis; that 
those regions that constrained executives’ attempts to build clientelistic networks 
during the 17th-19th centuries exhibit significantly higher levels of quality of 
government today, controlling for standard political, cultural and socio-economic 
indicators. 
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1. Introduction 
 
According to a large number of studies, “quality of government” is a key factor for 
understanding the economic and social development of a country (for a summary, see 
Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009). Yet what is understood by “quality of 
government” in the literature? Empirically, “quality of government” is frequently proxied 
for outcome indicators (no formal legal codes) regarding the “quality” (no the “quantity”) 
of the policies delivered by a government: e.g. control of corruption, prevalence of the 
rule of law, government effectiveness or protection of property rights. Since all these 
cross-country indicators tend to be highly correlated – irrespective of the type of data and 
the methodology employed to collect them – the literature has noted that “it makes sense 
to talk about the quality of government as a general feature of countries” (Tabellini 
2007). Theoretically, an influential account of what unites lack of corruption, rule of law 
and government effectiveness is the one posed by Rothstein and Teorell (2008): quality 
of government (QoG) is when governments treat all individuals in an impartial way 
irrespective of their social, economic, political, cultural or ethnic position. 
A large body of cross-country evidence suggests the (positive) negative effects of 
an (im)partial government. For instance, corruption, by serving as an illegal tax that 
distorts the economy, has negative consequences for GDP growth (Mauro 1995, Mo 
2001), income inequality and poverty (Gupta et al. 2002), various health and education 
issues (Mauro 1998; Transparency International 2006; Holmberg, Rothstein and 
Nasiritousi 2009) and reduces investments both from abroad and from inside the country 
(Levchenko 2007). When government is partial to particular groups in society, it 
undermines the trust people have in their government and reduces the well-being of the 
excluded groups (Rothstein and Eek 2009). Low QoG can also lead to a lower 
environmental quality by tolerating illegal dumping of toxic waste, producing lower 
quality water, or merely through environmentally damaging policy decisions (Damania 
2003; Welsch 2004). All these can contribute to making a society less economically 
developed, more dangerous and unhealthy for its residents than it could have been 
otherwise (Saviano 2008). 
As a result of these findings, many “horse races” have taken place amongst 
multitude of legal, cultural, social, economic and political factors which could explain 
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why some countries exhibit systematically higher/lower levels of QoG (e.g. La Porta et 
al. 1997, 1999, Treisman 2000, 2007; Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003; Keefer 2007; 
Charron and Lapuente 2010). Yet, so far, comparative research in QoG has almost 
exclusively focused on national differences. Despite the large anecdotic evidence and 
single-country studies pointing out the importance of within-country differences in 
quality of government– e.g. between Northern and Southern Italy, across U.S. States or 
within India –, comparing the levels of quality of government in regions in a multi-
country context remains largely unexplored. The few notable exceptions of cross-regional 
comparisons (e.g. Tabellini 2005) deal theoretically with quality of government issues, 
but lack empirical indexes at regional level, using instead economic indicators as proxies 
for regional governmental performance. 
This paper aims at bridging that gap by exploring regional differences in QoG – 
understood, like in the cross-national literature, as control of corruption, impartial 
treatment of citizens, and government effectiveness – in three major policy areas – law 
enforcement, health and education – for which data has been gathered. In particular, the 
paper uses a perception-based indicator of QoG built from a 34,000-respondents survey 
from 172 regions within 18 EU member states from (reference deleted for anonymity). 
Section 2 shows how the regional QoG indicator was constructed and the validity tests it 
was subject to. Section 2 also provides some basic descriptive findings. The data shows, 
in the first place and in accordance with the cross-national literature (e.g. Besley and 
Persson 2007), that government performance characteristics are highly correlated. Having 
a low corrupt government in a particular area (e.g. education) goes hand in hand with 
having an effective government in another area (e.g. law and enforcement). Thus, similar 
to the comparative cross-country literature, this paper remarks that, in the light of the data 
explored here, it makes sense to talk about quality of government as a general feature of 
European regions. 
Secondly, the data shows how cross-regional differences in QoG often trump out 
cross-national ones – e.g. high quality regions in Northern Italy enjoy levels of QoG as 
high as regions in Germany or Austria while those in the South most resemble low-
performing regions in the New Member States. In addition, one can see how cross-
regional differences exist both within decentralized countries, but also within centralized 
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ones – that is, those in which all regions have the same formal institutions. Although 
fitting popular and accounts and case-studies, this finding represents a puzzle for the 
standard institutionalist explanations of quality of government. Why regions like Bolzano 
and Valle d’Aosta in Northern Italy have a level of quality of government closer to 
regions with totally different political institutions – in terms of, among many other, 
electoral systems, veto players, administrative apparatuses, and, both at national and sub-
national level – such as Västra Götaland in Sweden, than to regions with similar de jure 
institutions, such as Campania or Calabria? Or, why does Flanders in Belgium perform 
like a Scandinavian region, while Wallonia ranks similar to regions in Portugal?   
Section 3 advances the theoretical proposition of the paper to explain variations in quality 
of government. Similar to a recent trend in comparative literature, this paper considers 
that historical factors are major determinants of today’s governmental performance (La 
Porta et al. 1997, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, Tabellini 2005, 2007). In 
particular, following Tabellini’s (2005, 2007) pioneering analysis of sub-national 
variations in economic performance, we argue that past government institutions may have 
left a legacy in the posterior functioning of government institutions –i.e. not so much in 
the formal rules of the game, but in the informal rules of the game. Yet, while Tabellini 
and other earlier culturalist scholars (e.g. Banfield 1958, Putnam 1993) argue that it is 
through cultural values – that is, by creating individuals with better/worse moral values – 
that past institutions affect the performance of current government institutions, this paper 
proposes an alternative mechanism that does not require different – and problematic – 
assumptions of individual morality. the main proposition of this paper – that the historical 
absence of executive constraints negatively affects today’s quality of government 
Section 4 tests– vis-à-vis the main standard explanations in the literature on cross-
regional differences – and, most notably, that it is different cultural values (e.g. 
“generalized trust”) what matters. The results indicate that the effects of generalized trust 
disappear when controlling by the number of historical constrains on the executive. 
Similarly, standard political factors, such as the degree of fragmentation of power at 
regional level (for those regions having autonomous decision-making units), also lack 
significant effects when 19th-century constraints are taken into account. It is important to 
note that the analysis shows that it is constraints during the 19th century what matters. 
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When included, constraints in previous (or posterior) historical periods have insignificant 
– and sometimes even opposite – effects on quality of government. A concluding section 
discusses the tentative implications of this finding for both future research as well as 
policy-making.  
 
2. The dependent variable: differences in regional quality of government 
While national level QoG data for E.U. states are abundantly available, sub-national 
assessments are extremely limited.  In order to compliment the national assessments, we 
utilize data collected in a large, E.U. Commission-funded project on measuring quality of 
government within the E.U. While a more in depth description of the data collection and 
construction can be found in (reference deleted for anonymity), a survey of 
approximately 34,000 E.U. citizens was undertaken, (approximately 200 respondents per 
region) which constitutes the largest survey ever undertaken to measure QoG at the sub-
national level to date. A regional-level QoG index score for 172 NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 
regions within 18 E.U. countries was built based on survey questions on citizen 
perception of QoG.1 16 separate survey questions went into constructing the QoG index 
for each region. These QoG questions pertain to three key public services – education, 
health care and law enforcement.  The respondents were asked to rate their public 
services with respect to three related concepts of QoG – the quality, impartiality and level 
of corruption of the abovementioned services.2 
       Due to an admittedly limited amount of observations per region and an exclusive 
focus on only citizen perceptions, the sub-national survey assessment was combined with 
a national assessment from four of  the World Bank’s ‘World Governance Indicators’ 
(WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009 – henceforth ‘KKM’), ‘government 
effectiveness’, ‘rule of law’, ‘control of corruption’ and ‘voice and accountability’.  
These four indicators were aggregated (simple average) into one QoG index for each 
country.  This national level data accounts for the opinions of international investors and 
NGO regional experts which compliment the citizen perceptions data and provide a 
                                                 
1 NUTS 1 regions are from Germany, U.K., Sweden, Hungary, Greece, Netherlands and Belgium.  NUTS 2 
countries are Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Cz. Republic, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, France, 
and Austria. 
2 These are related concepts which have come up frequently in the comparative QoG literature, thus we try 
to include citizens’ opinion regarding all three, for more, see Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasturosi (2009).   
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greater number of observations, thus reducing the uncertainty around the estimates. The 
use of the WGI also allows the inclusion of the 9 smaller E.U. countries excluded from 
the sub-national survey.  For the best comparison, the WGI were used as the country 
mean and the regional survey provides the variation around that mean.  In some cases, 
such as Italy, Spain, Romania and Belgium, this variation is substantial, while in others, 
such as Denmark, Netherlands, Poland or Slovakia, the variation around the WGI 
estimate is insignificant.   
      In constructing the regional level data, it was followed the advice of the “Handbook 
on Constructing Composite Indicators” (2008) from the OECD and JRC. After internal 
consistency checks and tests at both the individual and aggregate regional levels, 
correlations and factor analysis determined the survey questions on QoG which would be 
used to build the regional QoG index. Margins of error were constructed for each region 
(95%) to account for the level of uncertainty of each regional estimate. Extensive 
sensitivity tests were done on both the WGI and the regional QoG survey index to test for 
robustness.3  Therefore, it can confidently be argued that the data is internally consistent 
and robust to alterations in the weights or aggregation.  It is important to note that it was 
found that the exclusion of any one underlying indicator does not change the results of 
either the national or regional assessment in any meaningful way (reference deleted for 
anonymity). 
       The data is standardized with an EU mean of ‘0’ and a standard deviation of ‘1’ such 
that higher values equal higher QoG.  An examination of figure 1, which displays the 
descending rank-order of all 27 E.U. countries in QoG, elucidates some puzzles that this 
paper aims to address. As we know from simply looking at the WGI estimates at the 
national level, QoG varies substantially within the EU, not only between the New 
Member States and the rest, but even among the six founding countries. For example, the 
Netherlands is consistently a top performer in QoG (over two standard deviations above 
the mean) on most WGI indicators, but Italy ranks below the mean in some cases, in 
particular with respect to corruption. However, the data at the regional level reveal that 
the national assessment undervalues the stronger performing regions and overestimates 
                                                 
3 For a deeper look at the robustness checks for the WGI data, see Charron (2010) ’The Quality of the 
Quality of Government Data.’ For an examination of the regional index robustness checks, see (reference 
deleted for anonymity).   
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the weaker performing regions with respect to QoG where within-country regional 
variation is high.   
***Figure 1 about here*** 
               At times, the data show clearly that within-country QoG variation is either 
equally or more important than variation between EU countries themselves. In fact, 
within-country variation is at times wider than cross-country variation.  For example, the 
data show that the gap between Bolzano (IT) to Calabria (IT) is much larger than then the 
distance between the national averages between Sweden and Spain, or even between 
Germany and Slovakia. Moreover, the data show that Flanders (BE) is one of the top 
performing regions throughout the E.U. among the likes of Danish, Swedish or Dutch 
regions, while Brussels and Wallonia rank much more similarly to an average region in 
Portugal or Spain.  These examples point out the importance in going beyond national 
level comparisons, which have almost monopolized the comparative literature on QoG.  
Additionally, Figure 1 provides further support for those views critical with 
institutionalism. According to an institutionalist approach, we should see more regional 
divergences in those countries where regions have more self-governmental capabilities 
and thus different institutions – such as Germany, Austria or Spain – than in those where 
there is little or none margin of manoeuvre for regional authorities (if they exist at all) in 
delivering policies – e.g. Romania, Portugal, Poland or Denmark. Yet, one can see large 
variations in QoG in highly centralized countries (e.g. Romania) as well as in highly 
decentralized ones (e.g. Belgium); conversely, there are both highly centralized (e.g. 
Denmark) and highly decentralized (e.g. Germany) countries with homogeneous regions 
in terms of QoG.  
In other words, the existence of autonomous regional institutions – and, thus, 
more heterogeneous than in centralized countries – can not explain regional variations in 
QoG performance. There must be factors other than the type of formal institutions to 
account for why some regions present higher levels of QoG than others. Figure 1 thus 
gives further support for a finding pointed out by several scholars. If formal institutions 
rule, how can one explain the contrasting performance of the same type of institutions 
(e.g. judicial system, basic public services) we see in Southern and Northern Italy 
(Tabellini 2005: 3), or the differences across Mexican municipalities (Magaloni et al. 
 8
2007), or Russian provinces (Hale 2007) Similarly, studies in the private sector have 
shown significantly different levels of moral hazard in branches of the same private 
corporation situated in different geographical regions (Ichino and Magi 1999). According 
to several influential social scientists (Tabellini 2005: 3, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007:42-43), the existence of these notable sub-national differences shows the limits of 
institutionalism for explaining QoG-related outcomes. This has led scholars to shift, at 
least partially, their focus of attention towards non-institutional factors. Generally 
speaking (and a bit paradoxically), while economists consider institutionalism should be 
partially replaced or complemented by cultural values (e.g. Tabellini 2005, 2007, e.g. 
Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz 2004), political scientists move towards economic 
factors, such as interactions with levels of economic development (e.g. Kistchelt and 
Wilkinson 2007, Wilkinson 2007, Krishna 2007).  
On the contrary, this paper argues that institutionalism can mostly explain sub-
national differences if we take into account two premises: a broad definition of 
institutionalism and broad empirical proxies. Firstly, while formal institutions remain 
frequently the same across sub-national units within a country, informal institutions, such 
as the patronage networks we describe below (hypothesis 1), may critically change. 
Secondly, institutionalist explanations recurrently fail empirical contrast because they use 
a single variable as a proxy and for a short span of time, but using several proxies for the 
same theoretical mechanism and for an accumulated period of time, as this paper does 
(hypothesis 2), allows us to detect some slow-moving, yet significant, institutional 
effects.     
 
3. Theory: explaining regional variations in quality of government 
Which variable/s – other than political institutions – can change from region and thus 
constitute the basis for an explanation of the divergent regional levels of QoG? This 
section develops two institutionalist hypotheses, one based on past political institutions 
and the other in current political institutions. These hypotheses are based, but also 
significantly depart, from existing views on what produces quality of government.  
Before elaborating on our hypotheses, we disuses two leading alternative explanations of 
why QoG may vary from region to region. 
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3.1 Historical Institutions Hypotheses 
There are two, yet non-mutually exclusive types of accounts in the existing recent 
literature that provide not-strictly institutionalist answers to historical differentials across 
cities, regions or countries in QoG which could be referred to as the “equality theory” and 
the “culturalist theory.” They offer important insights that are up to certain extent 
corroborated here. Further, this paper builds upon the insights of both the equality and the 
culturalist approaches to QoG, but aims at providing a testable proposition with more 
concrete micro-foundations on why individuals within the governmental institutions in a 
region have more incentives than others to deliver policies, public goods and services in a 
more impartial way than others.  
Both approaches base their analyses on a key empirical finding: that, as 
increasingly shown by numerous studies, being Robert Putnam’s (1993) probably one of 
earlier and most influential ones, high performing regions in terms of QoG, democracy or 
economic development also tend to be high performing in some key social characteristics 
(Zak and Knack 2001; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). These regions also exhibit high 
levels of “social trust” – that is, with levels generalized trust – i.e. trust in strangers or 
people who do not belong to “your group”. On the contrary, regions in the lower end of 
the scale in terms of QoG or economic development tend also to show high levels of 
particularized (in-group) trust and low levels of generalized trust. Not only this, but also 
anti-social norms, ranging from not poor observation of basic traffic rules to not using 
properly public bins, are also seen as more prevalent in the latter group of regions, 
according to the qualitative findings of a report on QoG in the E.U. (Charron, Lapuente, 
Rothstein 2010). Or, as intuitively, Tabellini (2007, 3) points out, “while blocking traffic 
in a highway is widely considered a natural and legitimate form of political protest in 
countries like Italy or France, it would scarcely be tolerated by public opinion in Sweden 
or the US.” That is, “good” (or “bad”) governmental, economic and social (i.e. “trust”) 
characteristics cluster together consolidating virtuous or vicious circles. Despite these 
common features, the equality and the culturalist theories differ in how these clusters 
emerge, leading to noteworthy different normative prescriptions. 
 
3.1.1 “Equality Theory” Explanations 
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In the first place, these clusters have been explained, explicitly or implicitly, with 
references to what comparativist scholars (e.g. Pierson 2000) call feedback mechanisms 
or increasing returns between socio-political variables. An early example of the “equality 
theory” would be Boix and Posner’s (1998: 687) argument that the level of social capital 
in a region to be the “degree of social and political inequality that the community has 
experienced over the course of its historical development.” Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) 
offer a more developed version of the equality argument. They describe how feedback 
mechanisms among key governmental and social variables make countries enter virtuous 
(or vicious) cycles in key societal and governmental variables. Government policies, such 
as universal welfare benefits and impartial polities, would lead to the development of a 
stronger sense of social solidarity within a community and generalized trust. In turn, this 
higher social engagement and cohesion would make policy-making and implementation 
easier through informal norms for contributing to the provision of public goods, such as, 
for instance, respecting basic rules, paying taxes, protecting public spaces or engaging in 
social activism to demand the response of public authorities to common problems of the 
community.  
On the contrary, following Rothstein and Uslaner, a vicious cycle would emerge 
in those polities where corrupt, partial and inefficient governmental policies precludes the 
sense of social solidarity and spurs particularized trust at the expense of generalized trust. 
Where “people have faith only in their in-group” – understanding by it either a family, a 
clan, an ethnic group or other social groupings such as a political party – a society, and 
thus its politics, is “seen as a zero-sum game between conflicting groups” (Rothstein and 
Uslaner 2005, 45-46). In these conditions, citizens feel less attached to their political 
communities than to a particular social group and thus less eager to contribute to the 
provision of general public goods, such as paying taxes, respecting and protecting public 
spaces and, very importantly, engaging in social and political mobilizations asking for 
improvements in quality of government. Generally speaking, free-riding becomes more 
frequent at all social levels. In turn, public authorities lack both adequate resources and 
incentives to deliver policies, consolidating a vicious spiral.  
Despite the plausibility of its mechanisms and, as we will see below, its relative 
accuracy in describing what the relationships among these variables in European regions, 
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this theory of virtuous/vicious spirals or clusters lacks a proper explanation on why 
historically some polities entered in a positive o negative spiral to start with. We thus 
seek to fill that theoretical gap.  Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) do however offer a 
tentative answer by pointing out to the relative historically higher levels of both 
economic equality and equality of opportunity (i.e. an impartial government that does not 
discriminate among citizens) in those countries (e.g. late 19th century Nordic countries) 
consolidating later on virtuous cycles than in those trapped in vicious ones. Economic 
equality and an impartial government are the two factors standing at the beginning of 
their theoretical causal chain (ibid. 44).  
However, we lack larger-N studies confirming that it is not a few particular cases 
(e.g. Scandinavian countries) that are driving the results in Rothstein and Uslaner (2005). 
More importantly, we lack testable propositions containing precise micro-foundations on 
why some polities entered one path or the other. Which type of equality and, under which 
circumstances matters the most for triggering virtuous cycles? The theory of this paper 
agrees with the importance that Rothstein and Uslaner give to historical factors creating 
path-dependencies and with their implicit institutions-based (unlike the most prevailing 
culture-based approaches) view that social trust. It is more appropriate to see better 
government as leading to high social trust than vice versa. Yet, despite they show the 
reinforcing effects of these macro-variables – that is, that they have clustered historically 
and cluster nowadays – the main authors of what we refer to as the “equality theory” 
cannot disregard why some countries, if it is not as a result of relatively high levels of 
social trust, were able to provide relatively high levels of quality of government at the 
end of the 19th century.   
 
3.1.2 “Cultural Theory” Explanations 
A second strand of accounts on why some regions have historically higher QoG 
than others is the culturalist view. From a more sociological point of view, highly 
influential proponents of the importance of some cultural values would include the classic 
works by Banfield (1958), Putnam (1993) or Fukuyama (1995). Recent works by 
economists, like Glaeser et al. (2004) and Tabellini (2005, 2007), have also adopted a 
cultural turn for understanding differentials in economic development. “Culture”, instead 
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of “institutions”, would be the mechanism through which history affects current 
performance of either countries (e.g. Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz 2004) or sub-
national units (Tabellini 2005). Culture is measured through a diverse set of variables in 
this literature, including genetic and geographic distance understood as proxies for 
cultural barriers (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2005); religious beliefs (Barro and McCleary 
2003); or the possibility of “pronoun drop” in a language – e.g. impossible in English, 
possible in Spanish – (Licht, Goldschmidt and Schwartz 2007).  
Yet the most pervasive cultural variable in these studies, and the one that has 
already been tested for explaining sub-national differences in Western Europe (Tabellini 
2005), is the abovementioned degree of social trust. As a result of a certain historical 
variables (e.g. political institutions and education levels during the 17th-19th centuries), 
some regions (e.g. Northern Italy), saw the consolidation of certain cultural traits: high 
trust/respect for others and high confidence in the individual. On the contrary, in other 
regions (e.g. Southern Italy) values of low trust/respect for others and low confidence in 
the individual prevailed. The novelty of Tabellini’s (2005) is that, unlike the traditional 
institutionalist approach which considered historical institutions to affect current 
economic performance was via political institutions (e.g. certain characteristics of the 
political or electoral system), he claims that historical institutions determine cultural 
values and these, in turn, determine economic performance. Averaging the individual 
responses to the World Value Surveys for each of 69 sub-national regions of 8 European 
countries, Tabellini shows that there is notable effect of proxies for social capital (e.g. 
level of social trust) for explaining cross-regional difference in economic development. 
Going backwards, he finds that social capital variables are the result of historically high 
levels of education in the region and a large number of constraints on the executives 
governing those regions from 1600 onwards. 
Tabellini (2007) broadens the analysis empirically – by looking at worldwide 
cross-national differences – and offers a more accurate theoretical argument surrounding 
the idea of morality. The “conceptions of what is right and wrong” vary from a 
geographical area to another (as a result of historical legacies, and very particularly of the 
area being subjected to more or less despotic powers historically) and they explain the 
different functioning of political and bureaucratic organizations, setting better or worse 
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conditions for economic development. In some areas (i.e. those which exhibit high levels 
of social trust) what is right is a “generalized morality”: the norms of good conduct apply 
to all individuals. In other areas (i.e. those which exhibit low levels of social trust) what 
is right is a “limited morality”: the norms of good conduct apply only to the narrow group 
with which the individual identifies. While the former morality prevents free riding, the 
latter fosters it: cheating on taxes if you are a taxpayer, accepting bribes if you are 
bureaucrat, or tolerating corrupt elected officials if you are a voter, are all more 
acceptable behaviours in societies with a prevailing “limited morality” (Tabellini 2007, 
8). In turn, these moral values are transmitted across generations, with the accumulated 
result of higher quality of government in those polities with “generalized morality”. 
Despite the use of instrumental variables to control for endogeneity issues and the 
remarkable empirical findings by Tabellini (2005, 2007) both for explaining national and 
regional differences, it is difficult to theoretically sustain an explanation of the sort that 
“better” people leads to a “better” quality of government. It is plausible to suspect the 
existence of an omitted variable explaining both the consolidation of certain moral values 
as well as quality of government. To build a more satisfactory theory, one should aim at 
finding a variable that would not force us to assume (even if implicitly) that that you 
simply have different types of individuals in different regions or that the utility functions 
of individuals significantly differ from one region to another. That is the goal of this 
section and we proceed in two steps: first, a brief empirical visualization of the empirical 
relationships predicted by the cluster and the culturalist approaches for the regional 
sample gathered in this paper; and, second, the formulation of our hypothesis.  
In Figure 2 we take a broad look at QoG in relation to two of the major social, 
political and economic variables pointed out in the abovementioned literature. Figure 2 
partially validates the accounts by authors of the cluster or the culturalist approaches to 
QoG. In general, there seems to be a statistical relationship among a major political 
variable (the EU regional QoG index), a major economic one (regional income) and a 
major social one (social trust at regional level). Yet there are some noteworthy 
differences. On the one hand, GDP per capita is strongly correlated with QoG, with GDP 
per capita (averaged from1999-2008) explaining 45% of the variation of QoG within the 
EU regions. Yet, although the bivariate relationship between social trust and QoG is 
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significant at the 99% level of confidence, the indicator used for social trust explains only 
12% of the variation of QoG for the 73 cases for which data is available (see the Data 
section for detailed information on the data sources).   
***Figure 2 about here*** 
 Therefore while economic development seems to be substantially correlated with 
QoG – which, as the literature mentioned in the introduction has noted, could be the 
result of good government leading to economic growth as much as vice versa – the same 
does not hold for the close relationship predicted by the cluster and culturalist approaches 
between individuals with good values (e.g. social trust) and good government. One 
should expect a stronger correlation between these two variables if QoG is the result of a 
long historical accumulation of individuals with good morality (as argued by culturalists) 
or of feedback effects and increasing returns between social trust and good government 
(as argued by the vicious-virtuous clusters approach). For instance, there are numerous 
regions with well-below average levels of social trust but well-above QoG, such as 
Schleswig-Holstein (DE), North East England, Flanders and Alentejo (PT). Conversely, 
regions like Aragon, Veneto and Lombardia have unusually low levels of QoG despite 
their above-average levels of social trust.   
 
3.2 Our Contribution – ‘Past Executive Constraints and Clientalistic Networks’ 
This paper does not argue that worse performing regions have worse (in moral 
terms) individuals. We assume individuals have similar morality, but they are exposed to 
different sets of incentives in different regions as a consequence of the network effects 
created by historical institutions. Following the mostly qualitative works by 
administrative historians, starting with Shefter’s (1977, 1994) pioneering studies, we 
focus our attention in the historical process of emergence of patronage and clientelistc 
networks. The reason is that, once a structure for delivering clientelistic or patronage jobs 
is in place, it leads to the “pliability of the structures of public-decision making to 
particularistic considerations” (Piattoni 2001: 17). In other words, early patronage-
clientelistic networks set path-dependencies that dissuade off-equilibrium behavior. 
Using the example of farmers pointed out by Chandra (2007: 87), if politicians have the 
discretionary power to give certificates of eligibility to farmers in order to apply for a 
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subsidy, even impartially passed laws – i.e. with objective conditions to grant subsidies – 
may become instruments of patronage politics.   
These clientelistic networks distributed patronage jobs in the public sector and 
public procurement contracts and, in general, emphasized the delivery of targeted private 
goods at the expense of non-targeted public policies. For example, a patronage network 
per excellence, like that of the 19th century Spanish caciques could control almost all jobs 
within a given territory, “from night watchman to judge” (Carr, 1980: 11). Once created, 
these networks set a path dependency which affected the choices not only of those actors 
initially involved, but of future generations. Namely, if individuals of the current 
generation see clientelistic contacts to deliver higher payoffs than merit in former 
generations, they adjust their investments in human capital accordingly: e.g. it is not so 
important to study hard a subject or how to set up a business as to establish the right 
(political) connections with the individuals who grant business licenses or distribute jobs 
in the public sector. An extreme version would be Palermo, as famously depicted by 
Chubb (1982: 91) as “a city where politics is perceived as the only road to obtaining 
secure employment.”   
Generally speaking, a key characteristic of what Chandra (2007: 86-87) defines as 
a “patronage democracy” is that the state, by virtue of either direct delivery of jobs or all 
sort of particularized favors, becomes “the principal means of obtaining both a better 
livelihood and higher status.” We argue that the individuals in a region dominated by 
patronage networks face strong incentives to devote significant personal efforts – which 
are diverted from other investments in human capital – to the two activities which 
enhance the most the chances of better livelihood and status according to Chandra: in 
case they possess enough economic and social capital, individuals will enter political 
careers themselves and, in case they lack those capitals, individuals will try to obtain 
access to those controlling key state resources. In those societies where “virtually 
everyone” is recommended to any job by some patron – using Chubb’s (1981: 114) 
description of Palermo –, being outside a patronage network – either in power or in-
waiting – involves too many individual costs for the citizens of the region. 
  As a result, the region will be dominated by an “overwhelming preoccupation 
with politics” (ibid). Visual representations of this overwhelming preoccupation would be 
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the demonstrations of public anger that changes in local government power – as a result 
of pivotal councilors shifting party – may provoke in some Spanish towns. A high degree 
of politicization could thus be explained by a Tammany Hall structure of incentives 
permeating both rulers and voters’ incentives (Riordon 1994).  
These networks became institutionalized. In some cases, this institutionalization 
of patronage took place in a more informal manner, through, for instance, local caciques 
structures that were inherited through family links, such as the ones entrenched in Spain 
during the 19th century (Blakeley 2001, Lapuente 2007). As Hale (2007) shows in the 
analysis of clientelism in post-communist countries, clientelism can also be sustained 
through “non-party forms of political organization.” In others, the institutionalization of 
patronage led to the creation of more sophisticated party machines, like the Italian DC 
(Warner 2001, Hopkin and Mastropaolo 2001). Patronage has also been found as 
historically transmitted, thanks to a combination of formal and informal mechanisms, 
from the 19th up until now in Greece (Papakostas 2001). Generally speaking, Southern 
European bureaucracies exhibit the common denominator of a historical path dependency 
in patronage (Sotiropoulos 2006).  
The long-lasting legacy effects of 19th century patronage networks in some 
European countries have been studied in comparative public administration qualitative 
analyses, being the edited volumes by Piattoni (2001) and Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
(2007), two of the most encompassing collection of historical cases studies and 
comparative small-N analysis of clientelism up to date. While patronage dynamics have 
been set in motion, politicians (or patrons) tend to create associational “pillars” around 
particular business groups or political parties, such as the cases of post-WWII Austria, 
Belgium, Italy or Japan could show (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). The inertias of 
patronage networks determine a path dependency which may trap even political parties 
willing to curtail patronage, as Müller (2007) argues. A political party willing to move 
from a highly particularized provision of public services to an impartial delivery would 
need to fight, first, the opposition of their core constituencies, whose “vested rights” to 
the share of the spoils would be frustrated; and, second, a credibility problem with the 
rest of voters, who would remain skeptical of larger reforms after a long history of 
patronage.  
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Yet we lack large-N empirical assessments of up to which extent they do affect 
contemporary government outcomes – especially when controlling for other alternative 
factors. In order to do so, we need testable propositions that allow us to predict why some 
regions in Europe ended up creating those enduring patronage networks. As a growing 
literature is showing, there can be many factors, including legal traditions (e.g. La Porta 
et al. 1999) or state origins (Charron, Dahlström and Lapuente 2010) affecting the 
historical prevalence of patronage or corruption. However, the importance of past 
political institutions has been mostly overlooked in this literature 
We argue that the period of consolidation of state structures and of expansion of 
governmental activities in Europe the executives of all polities – many of them 
coinciding with the borders of current nation-states, yet many with what nowadays are 
sub-national units – enjoyed a rapid increase in the level of patronage and clientelistic 
resources they could distribute. All executives have enjoyed historically periods with 
significant potential patronage goods to distribute in a particularistic way to core 
supporters that could allow them to survive longer in power. Yet not all the executives 
chose that path. This paper argues that those executives who did not face important 
constraints – either in the form of a strong and independent legislature, judiciary or 
bureaucracy – enjoyed an unusually broad margin of maneuver to create clientelistic 
networks in order to increase their probabilities to survive in power.  
This argument echoes some historical narratives in the literature on clientelism. 
Patronage prospers, and consolidates, there where rulers “enjoy significant discretion in 
the implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state” 
and “vast resources” (Chandra 2007: 86); they become “monopolists with control over 
critical resources” and thus can exploit their market power to demand compliance from 
others (Magaloni et al. 2007). The conditions in which patronage flourishes best is when 
all power – political and even economic – power is concentrated in the same hands 
without proper external watchdogs in the form of an independent media/judiciary (Müller 
2007; 267). The epitome would be the Argentinean “dueño del pueblo” or owner of the 
town, who controls monopolistically both the local political and economic realms 
(Medina and Stokes 2007). This relationship between (unconstrained) power and 
clientelism was already noted by early scholars of the phenomenon. For Scott (1972) 
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patron-client relationships develop because some individuals accumulate extraordinary 
levels of power regarding most other members of the community. Our hypothesis is that 
the closer a region has been historically to that ideal of “dueño del pueblo” – that is, 
power without external constraints – the more likely an informal institution of “patronage 
network” to have survived across time, producing a constant deviation of public activity 
from impartiality to a particularistic delivery of public jobs, goods and services. The 
hypothesis would thus state as follows: 
H1: The more constraints on the executive a region has historically experienced, the less 
likely patronage networks have consolidated for the distribution of particularized public 
goods, and, as a result, the higher the current regional level of quality of government. 
 
***Figure 3 about here*** 
        Figure 3 demonstrates the bivariate relationship between historical executive 
constraints and regional levels of QoG for 73 EU regions.  As is the case with social trust 
and economic development in Figure 2, we find a strong and significant positive 
relationship between the two variables, suggesting initial evidence for H1.  Moreover, all 
but a handful of low-QoG Italian regions fit into the 95% confidence interval around the 
linear prediction between historical constraints and contemporary regional QoG.  What 
this shows in addition is that contemporary executive constraints is not an appropriate 
instrument variable for ‘trust’ Tabellini’s QoG-trust model, as he argues is the correct 
specification, due to the fact that it is so highly correlated with current levels of QoG, 
thus his model is miss-specified.   
 
3.3 Contemporary Institutions Hypothesis 
Despite the fact that we have argued the main hypothesis of the paper regards historical 
institutions, a full institutionalist explanation should also take into account the importance 
of contemporary political institutions. For instance, as several authors have noted, how 
we select (i.e. characteristics of the electoral system) political incumbents may matter 
(Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003; Kunikova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Chang and 
Golden 2006). We will control for these factors in the empirical analysis, but we focus 
here, symmetrically to the historical and main hypothesis deployed above, on how power 
is exercised nowadays and how this may marginally affect the path-dependencies 
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generated historically. In particular, we develop an alternative hypothesis to H1, which 
covers what Lapuente and Nistotskaya (2009: 433) define as intratemporal fragmentation 
of political power – i.e. up to which extent the ruling party faces other veto players, such 
as in a coalition government – and intertemporal fragmentation of power – i.e. up to 
which extent the same political party has been governing the same polity.  
The prevailing view in the literature – specially in large-N studies following an 
economics perspective – is that fragmentation of political power in democratic settings 
increases QoG. In the first place, and regarding to synchronic fragmentation of power, 
“the conventional view that holds that political and institutional checks and balances that 
constraint policy-makers discretion serve to limit policy volatility and thus encourage 
investment and economic growth appears as well founded” (Henisz 2004: 18). Similarly, 
Andrews and Montinola (2004) show that having more veto players, such as a coalition 
government, leads to lower levels of corruption because of the rising coordination costs 
among the members of different political parties. Looking at fragmentation of powers 
diachronically, several economists have traditionally argued that political competition 
leads to lower levels of clientelism (e.g. Stigler 1972, Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 
2001).   
However, the empirical evidence is mixed (Manow 2002). In addition, there are 
some illustrative cases pointing out in the opposite direction, as Müller (2007: 259) notes. 
Countries like Sweden or Norway, overwhelmingly ruled by Social Democratic 
governments in the post-war period, tend to rank at the top in any cross-country indicator 
of QoG. In the sub-national sample explored here, two regions that excel in perceived 
levels of QoG, like Pais Vasco or Bayern, have also been mostly governed during the 
latest decades by hegemonic, in this case Christian Democratic, parties. This paper argues 
that these cases can be part of a larger pattern: that, the fragmentation of power at 
regional level, when it takes place within a fully democratic context with proper 
institutional checks and balances, may have an opposite effect to that predicted by the 
standard economic literature. Once a country is a democracy, political fragmentation of 
power may be conductive to lower levels of QoG. We develop this prediction because, 
unlike the abovementioned prevailing economics perspective, we do not regard QoG as 
mostly a negative policy outcome: that is, the absence of corruption and a partial delivery 
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of public goods. Following some recent contributions to the literature (e.g. Charron and 
Lapuente 2010, Lapuente and Nistotskaya 2009), the premise of this paper is that QoG 
requires constant and large investments of public resources – e.g. to keep a meritocratic 
recruitment system, to create politically isolated administrative corps. The costs of those 
investments are obvious for politicians at short term (e.g. they lose potential patronage 
jobs), but politicians can only benefit from them at medium-long term: when voters note 
the improvement in the delivery of public services of a patronage-free administration. 
Ruling parties with short time horizons or with little power will be unwilling and/or 
unable to undertake those investments in QoG. That is, when a new governmental agency 
is created, they will have relatively high incentives to satisfy short-term party goals 
through it. On the contrary, the higher the accumulation of power a ruling party has – 
either intertemporally or intratemporally –, the more likely it is that the party finds 
electorally profitable to marginally invest in good governance instead of marginally 
satisfy short-term core constituencies’ demands.  Therefore, our second hypothesis would 
thus state as follows: 
H2: Within long-established democracies, the less fragmented the political power both 
inter-temporally – i.e. the same party has been in power for long – as well as intra-
temporally – i.e. single party government – in a sub-national unit is, the higher its level of 
quality of government. 
 
4. Data, Sample and Methods 
4.1 Dependent Variable 
As explained earlier, we employ the E.U. QoG Index variable from (reference deleted for 
anonymity), which is available for all 27 countries and 172 NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions 
in the European Union for the year of 2009.  The variable is standardized within E.U. 
(mean of ‘0’ and standard deviation of ‘1’), such that higher scores equal higher levels of 
QoG.  Among the regions within the sample employed here (all come from E.U.-15 
states), the range is from -2.53 (ITF3 - Campania) up to 1.59 (NL1 - Nord Nederland), 
thus spanning over three full standard deviations in the data.   
 
4.2 Independent Variables  
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Our independent variables of note capture three broad aspects of each region: first, the 
historical levels of executive constraints – capturing hypothesis 1; second, several 
variables reflecting the current political institutions in place in the European regions – 
proxies for hypothesis 2; and third, the level of social trust – which, according to the 
“equality” and “culturalist” theories, reinforces QoG by virtue of having individuals with 
more generalized instead of particularized values and would be the main mechanism 
through which past institutions affect contemporary QoG.  
As noted in the paper in which this data is presented, “a remarkable feature of 
European history is that regions now belonging to the same country were ruled by very 
different political institutions in the distant past” (Tabellini 2005: 17). The key 
independent variable capturing the historical opportunities to develop patronage networks 
is the constraints on the executive (CONSTRAINTS) from 1600-1850, the last year – for 
which data is available – before all countries in the sample were unified (measured in 
1600, 1700, 1750, 1800 and 1850). This variable is taken from the pioneering study of 
regional differences by Tabellini (2005).  
The variable is based on criteria from POLITY IV and builds on similar work by 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002).4  The number of checks on a regional 
executive is a function of the strength of a representative legislature and/or independent 
judiciary.  CONSTRAINTS is available for 72 regions in a limited number of E.U. 15 
states and is a limited categorical variable that ranges from 1-7, with higher numbers 
indicating more constraints on the executive. A value of ‘1’ for example indicates no 
constraints on the executive, and in which case the rule at this time was more or less an 
absolutist monarch, while a ‘7’ corresponds to essentially a consolidated democracy, in 
which “accountability groups have effective authority equal to or greater than the 
executive in most activity”. Because certain regions in some countries like Italy or Spain 
for example, experience diachronic variation in executive constraints that is different than 
other regions of their country today, while other countries, like the Netherlands, have 
completely homogeneous regional change, we take employ Tabellini’s ‘pc_institutions’ 
variable, which combines all five data points and takes the first principle component of 
the five time points on executive constraints.  It ranges from -2.09 to 3.58.   
                                                 
4 A full description of the coding decisions of this variable is found in: Tabellini (2005). 
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         We control for several alternative explanations – or, to be more precise, 
complementary – explanations, since the arguments of the “equality”, “culturalist” and 
our “networks” theories are similar in underlining the role of historical path 
dependencies. One significant difference is that while our proposal is more institutionalist 
– i.e. past political institutions, through other mediating institutions between society and 
the state (e.g. patronage party-machines, caciques), affect QoG – both the equality and 
the culturalist approaches emphasize the mediating role of individual values – in 
particular, of how prevailing generalized trust is. Therefore, we test whether recent 
estimates of social trust have a significant impact on QoG, taken also from Tabellini 
(2005). Social trust (TRUST) is measured as the percentage of respondents who answer 
that “Most people can be trusted” (the other two answers being “Can’t be too careful” 
and “Don’t know”) to the question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”, from the World 
Value Surveys, (Inglehart et al. 2000). Tabellini takes the data from two waves of the 
survey – 1990-91 and 1995-97 – and assigns each responded to their corresponding 
region. The mean number of respondents per region in the sample is 320. The TRUST 
variable ranges from 14.18 to 64.14, with higher values equating to higher levels of social 
trust.   
        Next, we test for the effects of a number of current political institutions capturing 
the across-time and within-time fragmentation of power from hypothesis 2.  One, we test 
for the presence of single party rule in a region SINGLE PARTY, which is the proportion 
of years from 1997-2009 a region has been ruled by a single party (from 0-1). This is the 
main variable capturing the accumulation power of in the same hands (i.e. the ruling 
party) in a given period. Two, we test for electoral thresholds (THRESHOLD), which 
ranges from 0-5.7.  This variable is an additional proxy for capturing the degree of 
accumulation of power: the higher the threshold, the more consolidated is the political 
power of the existing parties. Third, as a further proxy for (lack of) accumulation of 
power, we test the impact of minority government (MINORITY), which is the proportion 
of years from 1997-2009 that a region has been ruled by a minority government. Minority 
government implies other veto players have a potentially significant say in policy-
making, thus reducing the accumulation of powers. Fourth, the consecutive years in 
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power (CONSECUTIVE) is the number of years that the current party (or government) 
has been in power (coded as consecutive even if small parties change in and out of the 
coalition as often the case in Belgium, so long as the largest party remains). This is a 
proxy for intertemporal accumulation of power around the same political party that has 
been used in the literature (Lapuente and Nistotskaya 2009) and found as exerting a 
significant effect on the development of meritocratic bureaucracies across 35 emerging 
countries.  
The paper also controls for other standard political factors prevailing in 
comparative analyses. First, regarding the type of electoral system, all regions in the 
sample use proportional representation (PR), thus testing whether various types of 
electoral formula impact corruption are not possible with this sample. Secondly, the 
effects of partisanship are tested with three simple dummy variables representing LEFT, 
CENTER and RIGHT governments. These contemporary political variables were 
collected (by authors) from data on European Election results from ‘Parties and Elections 
in Europe’5 and from individual region or country websites and coded as ‘LEFT’, 
‘CENTER’ or ‘RIGHT’ following the coding rules from the Database of Political 
Institutions (Keefer et al 2005).  Table 1 summarizes the availability of each of the 
variables within the sample.  
        As far as non-political standard controls, we include an indicator of economic 
development, as measured by regional PPP per capita (logged) from Eurostat, taken as 
the ten-year average from 1999-2008.  Based on the numerous empirical studies on the 
correlates of QoG we expect this variable to have a positive effect on our dependent 
variable. As a matter of fact, regional economic performance is considered by Tabellini 
(2005) as a partial proxy for the quality of government institutions, a variable for which 
he lacks a direct measure. Population (logged) is controlled for, and is taken from 
Eurostat. Based on the findings from (reference deleted for anonymity), we control for 
whether a region is a capital region or not, as capital regions tend to have systematically 
lower QoG than non-capital regions.     
        We are aware of several issues stemming from endogeneity and multicollinearity in 
the models.  First however, we are confident that since the primary independent variable 
                                                 
55 http://www.parties-and-elections.de/  
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of interest CONSTRAINTS occurred hundreds of years before the measurement of the 
dependent variable, our analysis is sufficiently protected against a blatant problem of 
endogeneity.  Regarding several other variables, such as the level of regional economic 
development, we are quite certain, like the vast majority of the literature (see Holmberg, 
Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2008 for a recent review), that this is endogenous to QoG – 
with persistent feedback effects between economic development and QoG. On this point, 
and in order to properly deal with this endogeneity in the sample of available data we 
work with, we take the ten year average of the level of GDP per capita in the region 
(1999-2008) before the year the dependent variable was measured (2009). Thus the GDP 
variable occurs temporally prior to the QoG variable.  Second, based on the results of 
Tabellini (2005), there is also strong empirical evidence to suggest that CONSTRAINTS is 
a significant determinant of present day GDP in a region.  On this potential problem of 
multicollinearity and endogeneiy between two independent variables in our analyses, we 
run models that include and exclude GDP when we test for the effects of CONSTRAINTS, 
as the multicollinearity between these two variables will likely render the standard errors 
of the estimates of CONSTRAINTS (along with GDP) less efficient.   
 
4.3 Sample 
Although data is available for QoG in 172 regions in the E.U., the indicator for political 
constraints in the 19th century are available for only 73 regions, all from E.U.-15 
countries6.  In all, regions from eight different countries – Austria, Netherlands, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium U.K. and Portugal – are included at times in the sample.  
However, when testing for the relevance of contemporary political institutions, only the 
“politically relevant” regions that have regional elections at the NUTS level of interest 
have such data, therefore, the Netherlands, U.K. and Portugal are excluded from these 
models (while Austria and former East German Länder are included), reducing the 
sample size from 73 to 66.  When TRUST is included, Austria and former East German 
                                                 
6 In Tabellni (2005) there are 69 region presented in his data.  In this he combines Bolzano, Trento, Friuli 
and Veneto into one region, which we separate into four separate regions.  Also, Valle d’Aosta and 
Piemonte are combined into one region, which we divide into two regions, hence the four extra regions in 
our analysis.   
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Länder also drop out, reducing the sample size to 51.  Table 1 summarizes the availability 
of data for each set of variables and the regions/countries that are included.   
***Table 1 about here*** 
 
5. Results  
In table 1 we examine the effects of past political institutions on current day QoG in 73 
regions, controlling for economic development, population and whether a region is a 
capital region or not along with TRUST.  Moreover we test for the country fixed effects in 
the last two models, which remove the effect of the common, contemporary national 
institutions shared by regions within a country that are not included in the regression.  
Thus we test both the effects of historical political constraints on regions on whole 
throughout the EU-15, and their impact on regions within the countries themselves.  
Table 2 displays the results. 
***Table 2 about here*** 
We begin with a simple baseline model of hypothesis 1 that we ran in Figure 1 and add 
controls in the second model. The initial results seem to corroborate our hypothesis 1 that 
historical constraints on the executive play a significant role in explaining variance in 
regional QoG today.  For example, the baseline model indicates that CONSTRAINTS, 
significant at the 99% level of confidence, explains about one third of the total variance 
in the dependent variable (R² is 0.33).  We find that even when adding the level of 
economic development, population and whether a region contains the capital city or not, 
the impact of CONSTRAINTS remains highly significant and the coefficient remains 
largely the same.  The estimate show that a one unit increase in CONSTRAINTS results in 
a 0.24 increase in QoG, or about 25% of one full standard deviation of the dependent 
variable, holding al other variables constant.  In the next five models, we take each year 
of the combined CONSTRAINTS variable from models 1 and 2 one at a time.  We do this 
to test whether one or two time periods in particular are driving the results. We find this 
not too be the case, as each of the five time periods of executive constraints is a 
significant predictor of contemporary levels of regional QoG.  However, the strongest 
effects seem to be from that latest two time periods - 1800 and 1850.   
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        In the final three models, we test the robustness of the results by including TRUST 
and adding country fixed effects.  We find that the effects CONSTRAINTS are not at all 
reduced by adding TRUST into the model, yet TRUST is insignificant both with and 
without country fixed effects in the models.  In the later two models, the impact of 
CONSTRAINTS on QoG is roughly half (to 0.13 down from 0.24 in model 2) when taking 
into consideration the fixed country effects, yet the variable of interest remains 
significant at the 95% and 90% confidence respectively in the last two models in Table 2, 
demonstrating strong robust evidence that both within and across countries, historical 
constraints on the executive in European regions play a key role in explaining variation of 
QoG at the regional level today.   
***Table 3 about here*** 
       In Table 3 we test the relationship between present day political institutions 
(hypothesis 2) and QoG.  It is important to note that in this sample, only regions that have 
elected governments are employed.  In general, we seek to understand whether the degree 
of accumulation vs. fragmentation of powers plays a role in determining levels of quality 
of government. As mentioned above, we proxy accumulation of political power with 
institutions such as the proportion of years a region has been governed by a single party, 
a minority government, the electoral threshold, how long the current party/coalition in 
power has been governing and the electoral threshold. All of these are either direct or 
indirect measures of accumulation of powers, power-sharing or veto players. 
The empirical evidence from models 1-4 suggest that regions with more accumulation 
of powers – i.e. fewer veto players or less power-sharing – perform, on average, better 
with respect to QoG.  For example, SINGLE PARTY, CONSECUTIVE and 
THRESHOLD, all significant determinants of levels of QoG, suggest that regions which 
produce more single party governments on average, have longer tenured governments, 
and have higher barrier to entry for smaller parties perform better on average.  In model 
6, when all four institutions are regressed together, we find that SINGLE PARTY and 
THRESHOLD still play a significant role, and continue to do so even when accounting 
for past historical constraints on the executive in model 7.  Partisanship however plays no 
role in explaining levels of QoG across EU regions.   
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        In the final models, we account for fixed country effects. The results here show that 
differences in modern data political institutions within countries do not play a significant 
role in determining variation in regional QoG.  This suggests that certain types of 
political institutions or patterns in power-sharing/veto players cluster within certain 
countries.  However, the CONSTRAINTS variable remains a significant determinant of 
QoG in all three models where we include it- both with and without country fixed effects 
and with and without directly accounting for regional GDP levels.  Thus we find that 
while modern day political institutions and power sharing is important across regions 
throughout the EU, these differences become negligible within countries (when taking 
into account country fixed effects).  However, the legacy of power-sharing networks as 
measured by historical constrains on the executive at the regional level has strong and 
robust impact on current levels of QoG. 
 How can one know that the variable “past institutions” acts through a mechanism 
of “patronage networks”, as claimed in this paper, and not through a mechanism of 
“trust”, as argued by the culturalist approach to QoG (e.g. Tabellini 2005). We cannot 
totally rule out the possibility that “trust” is the “missing link” to which Tabellini refers 
to, connecting past institutions with contemporary ones.  However, as shown by the 
strong and robust empirical relationship between CONSTRAINTS and QoG, past 
executive constraints are not an appropriate instrument for Tabellini’s model.  Further, as 
the material explored in this paper shows – preliminarily in the relatively low correlation 
between social trust and regional QoG in Figure 2 and more extensively in the analysis 
presented in this section – recent levels of TRUST do not have the same explanatory 
power as CONSTRAINTS. In other words, at least in relation to the value of “generalized 
trust”, it does not seem that having individuals with better values is what leads to higher 
levels of QoG in a region.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is mostly explanatory, by addressing the 
question of why some regions perform better than others in terms of QoG. In order to 
provide an account as encompassing as possible, this paper uses pioneering cross-time 
dataset in which a large number of political, cultural, socio-economic and historical 
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variables have been collected for a large number of European regions – that varies 
between 172 in the broadest analysis to 51 in the narrowest – and for a significant period 
of time – with historical variables from 1600 onwards and contemporary political factors 
from 1970s onwards.  
Similar to Tabellini (2010), one important finding is that historical factors (e.g. 
the existence of a historical tradition of “constraints on the executive” in place in the 
region already in the 18th-19th centuries) seem to matter for explaining nowadays 
differences across EU regions. Unlike Tabellini, who explores differences in economic 
performance, our dependent variable is a (perception-based) measure of QoG. In this 
regard, this paper provides a new empirical angle to a literature on regional differences 
which emphasizes qualitative differences between regions – e.g. Northern vs. Southern 
Italy, Wallonie vs. Flanders – but which lacked quantitative encompassing measures of 
QoG across both countries and regions. The general map of QoG emerging from this data 
seems to confirm most of this previous literature, with very important divergences in how 
citizens in different regions perceive the quality, impartiality and lack of corruption of the 
public administrations they encounter daily. Based on the theoretical and empirical 
literature on quality of government, it can be argued that such variation has important 
implications on the economic and social progress of lesser-developed areas within the 
Union. 
The paper develops two hypotheses, one regarding historical political institutions 
and the other regarding contemporary. The first hypothesis, on the negative effects of a 
past of unconstrained executives over contemporary levels of QoG via the survival of 
“patronage networks” seems to be more firmly corroborated in the empirical analysis. 
The second hypothesis, on the positive effects of accumulation of powers at sub-national 
level in democratic settings, is conditional to country effects and thus is only moderately 
confirmed. We find strong support for H1, and support for H2 across the entire sample.  
However, when taking country fixed effects into consideration, contemporary power-
sharing institutions cannot explain within-country regional variation of QoG.  Yet, at the 
same time, by showing that both synchronic and diachronic accumulation of power has a 
positive (and sometimes significant) effect over QoG, the paper makes a contribution to a 
literature that has generally claimed the opposite. The prevailing view has sustained that 
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both political competition (e.g. Stigler 1972) and multiple veto players (e.g. Andrews and 
Montinola 2004) should lead to better QoG. In the light of the results presented in this 
paper, this predictions are not fulfilled for European regions; if any, the opposite.  
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Table 1: Availability of Data       
Dep. Variable (QoG) index All 172 regions &  
& control variables   27 E.U. states   
Executive constraints (1850) Bel (3), W. Ger (10), Italy (21),  
      NL (4), Por (7), Spain (17), UK (11) 
Social trust  Bel, W. Ger, Italy, NL, Por,  
      Spain, UK    
Political Institutional  Austria (9), Bel, Ger (16), Italy, 
Variables     Spain (19),    
note: number of regions per country in parentheses.  'W. Ger' implies only West German Länder.  2 of Spain's overseas 
regions not included in the Tabellini dataset.  Only regions with elected regional governments of political significance 
contain political-institutional data. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Impact of Historical Institutions on Regional Levels of QoG and Robustness Checks     
  Baseline w/controls Executive Constraints at Various Time Points w/Trust
Fixed 
Effects 
F.E. 
w/Trust 
Constraints  0.26*** 0.24***      0.24*** 0.13** 0.11* 
  (6.36) (5.54)      (5.12) (2.02) (1.71) 
Constraints 1600   0.18**        
    (2.14)        
Constraints 1700    0.22***       
     (3.78)       
Constraints 1750     0.21***      
      (4.78)      
Constraints 1800      0.25***     
       (6.51)     
Constraints 1850       0.27***    
        (6.50)    
PPP per cap. (log)  0.87** 0.98** 0.92** 0.99** 1.19*** 1.23*** 0.83** 0.87** 0.79** 
   (2.32) (2.28) (2.23) (2.45) (3.08) (3.66) (2.01 (2.36) (2.03) 
Population (log)  -0.05 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.13* -0.13* 
   (-0.49) (0.38) (-0.12) (-0.27) (-0.81) (-0.42) (-0.55) (-1.89) (-1.97) 
Capital region  -0.51 -0.59 -0.51 -0.51 -0.59 -0.72** -0.47 -0.51** -0.48** 
   (-1.59) (-1.61) (-1.43) (-1.44) (-1.47) (-2.13) (-1.55) (-2.16) (-2.11) 
Trust         0.002  0.02 
         (0.27)  (1.38) 
Constant  0.12 -8.15** -10.38** -9.45** -10.45** -11.81*** -12.75*** -7.76* -6.68* -6.35* 
    (1.36) (-2.11) (-2.37) (-2.24) (-2.23) (-3.02) (-3.79) (-1.86) (-1.83) (-1.70) 
Rsq.  0.33 0.39 0.21 0.28 0.32 0.42 0.51 0.39 0.83 0.83 
countries  7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Obs.   73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 73 
note: dependent variable is the EU QoG index, (-2.5 to 2.5) with higher scores meaning higher QoG    
OLS with robust standard errors (t-statistics in parentheses).  The final two models are run with country fixed effects (estimates for country dummies not 
shown here). 
*** p>.01, **p>.05, *p>.10          
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Table 3: The Impact of Present Day Institutions on Regional QoG         
  ________________OLS with Robust Standard Errors__________________ ___w/ Country Fixed Effects__
    1 2 3 4 Partisanship Full          No GDP w/ Constraints 9 10 
Singleparty 0.62**     0.49* 0.74** -0.03 0.09 0.09 
  (2.15)     (1.70) (2.71) (-0.17) (0.53) (0.44) 
Minority   -0.79    -0.55 -0.19 0.13 -0.09 0.21 
   (-1.18)    (-0.97) (-0.42) (0.55) (-0.34) (1.03) 
Consecutiveyrs   0.03**   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (2.07)   (0.46) (0.69) (1.18) (0.25) (0.62) 
Threshold     0.22**  0.21* 0.24** 0.03 0.001 0.007 
     (2.21)  (1.91) (2.71) (0.46) (0.02) (0.12) 
Left      -0.06      
      (-0.21)      
Center      -0.04      
      (-0.19)      
PPP per cap. 
(log) 1.32** 1.08** 1.13** 1.08** 1.21** 1.08*   0.74 1.02 
  (2.56) (2.00) (2.22) (2.01) (2.18) (1.93)   (2.25) (2.35) 
Population (log) -0.14 -0.15 -0.14** -0.12 -0.12 -0.13 -0.02 -0.19** -0.17** -0.16** 
  (-1.27) (-1.01) (-2.31) (-1.26) (-1.13) (-1.22) (-0.15) (-2.15) (-2.23) (-1.99) 
Capital region -0.61 -0.43 -0.46 -0.59 -0.52 -0.58 -0.56 -0.34 -0.44* -0.87** 
  (-1.14) (-0.95) (-0.92) (-1.27) (-0.99) (-1.18) (-2.42) (-1.24) (-1.71) (-2.31) 
Constraints - - - - - - 0.28** 0.24*** - 0.12* 
        (2.37) (3.27)  (1.82) 
Constant  -12.22** -9.7* -10.25* -10.56* -10.85* -10.63* -0.99 0.56 -7.11** -9.80** 
    (-2.27) (-1.77) (-1.93) (-1.97) (-1.90) (-1.95) (-1.23) (0.87) (-2.26) (-2.25) 
Rsq.  0.19 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.14 0.27 0.33 0.75 0.81 0.78 
Countries  5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 
Obs.   66 66 66 66 66 66 51 51 66 51 
note: dependent variable is the EU QoG index, (-2.5 to 2.5) with higher scores meaning higher QoG    
OLS with robust standard errors (t-statistics in parenthesis)       
*** p>.01            
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Figure 2  
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Figure 3: Historical Constraints on the Executive and Regional QoG 
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Note: shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval around the linear prediction.  Number of observations is 73 
from Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Germany (West), U.K., Belgium and Portugal 
 
 
 
1. Electoral Threshold – the average electoral threshold from 1997-2009 (range: 0 – 5.7) 
2. Single Party – proportion of years between 1997-2009 that a single party controlled 
government (range: 0 – 1) 
3. Minority Government: proportion of the year between 1997-2009 that were 
controlled by a minority government (range: 0 -1) 
4. Consecutive years in power: The number of years that the current party (or 
government) has been in power (coded as consecutive even if small parties change in and 
out of the coalition as often the case in Belgium, so long as the largest party remains). 
Left government (0/1) – all partisanship variables follow the DPI (Keefer et al 2005) 
simple coding rules (authors’ construction).   
Center government (0/1) 
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Right government (0/1)  
 
Control variables: 
1. PPP per capita (logged) – from Eurostat 
2. Population density (logged) – from Eurostat 
3. Capital Region – (0/1) 
 
 
 
